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Abstract 
As a response to the concerns over the scale of banking failures in several OECD 
countries  over the last  decade, this paper explores the  advantages of  the new 
market disclosure regime that was implemented in New Zealand in 1996. It finds 
that, although New Zealand has many special features which make the new regime 
particularly suitable there, all the main principles can be applied elsewhere in the 
OECD, even in the context of  current EU legislation. These include: ensuring 
quality  of  corporate governance  of  those  financial  institutions  wishing  to  be 
registered  as banks, with  high  accounting and  independent auditing  standards; 
public disclosure of substantial information about the risks individual banks face 
so that  market disciplines can be  applied - including extending Value  at  Risk 
measurement to the whole of the banks' activities; placing the responsibility of the 
prudential operation of each bank on its directors and management, with penalties 
and financial liability for false statements; avoiding putting taxpayer funds at risk, 
by  making  it  clear  that  no  bank  is  too  big  to  fail  and  focusing  the  role  of 
supervisors on ensuring that they have the power to step in and prevent adverse 
consequences to the system as a whole when a bank gets into difficulty. By these 
means, the moral hazard inherent in bank supervision and the costs of supervision 
can be significantly reduced. 
Keywords: banking supervision, market discipline, systemic stability Markkinaehtoinen lahestymistapa 
rahoitusjarjestelrnan vakauden yllapitoon: 
Kokemuksia Uudesta Seelannista 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 18/97 
David G. Mayes 
Tutkimusosasto 
Tiivis  telma 
Viimeisen vuosikymmenen pankkikriisit ovat herattiineet huolestumista monissa 
teollisuusmaissa. Tassa raportissa tarkastellaan Uudessa-Seelannissa vuonna 1996 
kayttoon otetun, julkistamisperiaatteeseen nojautuvan pankkivalvontajiirjestelman 
etuja. Vaikka Uudella-Seelannilla on monia erityispiirteita, jotka tekevat uudesta 
jarjestelmasta juuri sille erityisen soveliaan, soveltuvat jiirjestelman kaikki paape- 
riaatteet muuhunkin OECD-alueeseen, myos  nykyisen EU-lainsaadannon yhtey- 
teen. Nama periaatteet ovat seuraavat: 
1)  yritysjohdon kontrollin laadun varmistarninen ja laadukkaat laskentatoimen ja 
riippumattoman tilintarkastuksen standardit rahoituslaitoksissa, jotka haluavat 
pankkitoimiluvan 
2)  markkinakurin edellyttiiman konkreettisen informaation julkistaminen  yksit- 
taisten pankkien riskinotosta; informaatioon on  sisallyttava pankkien koko 
toimintaa koskevat value-at-risk-laskelmat 
3)  pankkien johdon ja hallinnon pitaminen vastuullisina pankkien liiketoiminnan 
asiaankuuluvasta varovaisuudesta; tahan kuuluvat rangaistukset ja taloudelli- 
nen vastuu virheellisista tiedoista 
4)  veronmaksajien varojen vaarantamisen vdtthinen antamalla ymmwaa, etta 
mikaan  pankki ei  ole liian iso kaatumaan, ja  keskittamalla valvontaviran- 
omaisten toimet sen varmistamiseen, etta ne voivat puuttua asioihin ja estaa 
koko rahoitusjiirjestelman kannalta haitalliset seuraukset yksitt3isen pankin 
joutuessa vaikeuksiin. 
Nailla keinoin voidaan merkittavasti vahentaa pankkivalvontaan liittyvaa moraali- 
katoa ja valvonnan kustannuksia. 
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In  1996  New  Zealand  implemented  a  new  system  of  banking  supervision 
following a four year period of review. This new system has attracted considerable 
international interest as it represents a major step away from the prescriptive and 
intrusive  systems  that  have  normally  been  implemented  elsewhere.  It  is  an 
innovative response to the unfortunate fact that in recent years there have been 
substantial bank failures in Scandinavia, Japan, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, among many other countries. 
The principal feature of the new system is that it puts the responsibility for the 
prudent  management  of  banks firmly on  the  directors and  management of  the 
banks themselves. It makes it the responsibility of the supervisor to concentrate on 
e  stability of  the  financial  system  as  a  whole,  not  on  the  viability  of  any 
individual bank. Under this view, the 'moral hazard' present in banking systems 
should be  reduced and taxpayers'  money  should not be put  at  risk. Individual 
banks should expect to fail if they become insolvent, whatever their size. 
This  system  therefore  entails  a  network  of  incentives  to  ensure  that 
appropriate attention is paid  to the management of  risk by  bank  shareholders, 
directors, management, depositors, analysts and competitors. These incentives are 
applied  by  an  extensive  regime  of  quarterly disclosure  of  the  banks'  assets, 
liabilities and exposure to risks, backed up by  an attestation by  all the directors 
including the nonexecutive directors which each bank is required to have, that the 
bank is applying appropriate risk management procedures. Directors are liable to 
stiff fines and periods of imprisonment for false or misleading statements and have 
unlimited personal civil liability for losses incurred by others as a result of  these 
statements. While the Reserve Bank has  set out a basis it finds acceptable for 
measurement of  Value  at  Risk  the  registered banks  are  allowed to  implement 
adequate schemes better  adjusted to their  specific businesses.  The pressure on 
banks to run themselves well will come from depositors, who can take their funds 
elsewhere, from analysts and from competitors, who will be eager to point out 
items of relative weakness. 
However, the system does not rest on disclosure alone. It has three principal 
pillars of  which disclosure so that market disciplines can be applied is only one. 
The second is that the structure, ownership and management of the banks should 
be  such as to encourage prudential behaviour. There is thus  a  series of  wide- 
ranging  prior  conditions that have to be  met before a bank  can be  registered, 
relating to capital adequacy as laid down by the Base1 criteria, size, standing and 
corporate governance. Lastly the Reserve Bank has extensive powers to act swiftly 
and effectively in a crisis, including the ability to place an insolvent bank under 
statutory management. 
New Zealand, being a small country, with a small number of banks, almost all 
of which are foreign-owned and undertake only limited business overseas, is not 
typical of many of the other OECD countries. In particular it is unusual in having 
no deposit insurance. However, while having deposit insurance may limit the bite 
of the market discipline it does not invalidate the applicability of any of the main 
principles. These principles can be readily applied in the EU countries, consistent 
with their existing directives, including those on capital adequacy and protection 
of  depositors.  Indeed  the  idea  that  market  discipline  can  place  a  substantial incentive on banks to run themselves prudently will have a significant appeal as 
regulators struggle to keep pace  with  the rapid internationalisation of  banking 
operations and the rapid rate of innovation of financial products and IT  systems. 
Yhteenveto 
Vuonna 1996 Uusi Seelanti otti kayttoon uuden pankkivalvontajarjestelman neljan 
vuoden valmistelujakson jalkeen. Uusi jiirjestelma on herattanyt huomattavaa kan- 
sainvalista mielenkiintoa, koska se eroaa selvasti yleensa muissa maissa kaytetyis- 
ta ohjaavista ja  pankkien toimintaan puuttuvista jiirjestelmista. Uuden Seelannin 
jarjestelma  on innovatiivinen vastaus viime vuosina monissa maissa kuten Poh- 
maissa, Japanissa, Yhdysvalloissa ja  Iso-Britanniassa esiintyneisiin merkitta- 
viin pankkikriiseihin ja -konkursseihin. 
Uuden jiirjestelman tiirkein piirre on, etta siina vastuu pankkien luotettavasta 
johtamisesta  on  selvasti pankluen omalla johdolla ja  hallinnolla. Jiirjestelmassa 
valvojan asiana on keskittya rahoitusjiirjestelman vakauteen kokonaisuutena, eika 
yksittaisten pankkien elinkelpoisuuteen. Tiilloin pankkijiirjestelmissa esiintyvan 
"moraalikadon" pitaisi vahentya ja veronmaksajien varojen ei pitaisi olla vaarassa. 
YksittGsten pankkien olisi voitava menna nurin niiden koosta riippumatta. 
Markkinaehtoiseen jiirjestelmaan kuuluu kannustinten verkosto, jolla varmis- 
tetaan, etta pankkien omistajat, johtajat, hallinto, tallettajat, analyytikot ja kilpaili- 
jat kiinnittavat asianmukaisesti huomiota riskien hallintaan pankeissa. Nama kan- 
nustimet syntyvat laajassa, neljannesvuosittaisessa pankkien varojen, velkaojen ja 
riskitilanteen julkisessa raportoinnissa, jota tukee kaikkien johtajien - (myos ulko- 
puolisten johtajien, joita pankeilla on oltava) kirjallinen vakuutus sita, etta pankki 
soveltaa asianmukaisia riskinhallintamenetelmia. Vaarista tai harhaanjohtavista ra- 
porteista  seuraisi johdolle  ankaria sakko- tai  vankeusrangaistuksia; johdolla  on 
myos  taysi  vahingonkorvausvastuu vaiirien  tietojen muille  aiheuttamista vahin- 
goista. Vaikka Uuden Seelannin keskuspankki on maaritellyt perusteet, joilla riski- 
altistumista mittaavia Value-at-Risk laskelmia voidaan sen mielesta suorittaa, pan- 
kit voivat halutessaan kayttaa myos muita riittavia jiirjestelmia, jos ne vain sovel- 
tuvat paremmin niiden liiketoiminnan luonteeseen. Uuden Seelannin jiirjestelmas- 
sa pankkeihin kohdistuva paine hoitaa liiketoimintaansa kunnolla tulee tallettajilta, 
jotka voivat siirtaa varansa muualle, seka analyytikoilta ja kilpailijoilta, jotka ovat 
luonnollisesti karkkaita osoittamaan toiminnassa esiintyvia heikkoja kohtia. 
Jiirjestelma ei kuitenkaan perustu vain tietojen julkistamisperiaatteeseen. Silla 
on kaikkiaan kolme paapilaria, joista  markkinakurin vaatima julkisuus  on vain 
yksi. Toinen paapilari on, etta pankkien sisaisen rakenteen, niiden omistuksen ja 
hallinnon pitaisi olla sellaisia, etta ne rohkaisevat luotettavaan toimintaan. Niin 
ollen on asetettu monipuolinen joukko  ennakkoehtoja, jotka on taytettava ennen 
kuin pankki voi saada toimiluvan. Nama liittyvat Baselin vakavaraisuuskriteerei- 
hin, pankin kokoon, tilaan ja  siihen, miten omistajat valvovat pankin johtamista 
('corporate governance'). Kolmas pilari on, etta Uuden Seelannin keskuspankilla 
on laajat valtuudet toimia nopeasti ja tehokkaasti kriisitilanteessa. Valtuuksiensa 
mukaan se voi mm. asettaa vakavaraisuutensa menettiheen pankin viranomaisten 
hallinnon alaisuuteen. Koska Uusi  Seelanti on pieni maa, jossa  on vain vahan pankkeja ja naista 
melkein kaikki ovat ulkomaalaisessa omistuksessa eivatka toimi maan ulkopuolel- 
la, sen olot eivat ole monille muille teollisuusmaille tyypilliset. Erityisesti se on 
poikkeuksellinen siina suhteessa, etta maassa ei ole talletusvakuutusjiirjestelmaa. 
Vaikka talletusvakuutuksen olemassaolo saattaakin heikentaa markkinakuria, se ei 
kuitenkaan tee jiirjestelman paaperiaatteita mitattomiksi. Naita periaatteita voidaan 
suoraan soveltaa myos EU-maihin niissa voimassa olevien direktiivien (kuten va- 
kavaraisuus- ja  talletussuojadirektiivien)  mukaisesti.  Pankkivalvojien  kamppail- 
lessa pysyakseen mukana pankkitoiminnan kansainvalistyrnisen ja rahoitustuottei- 
den seka tietotekniikan  kehityksen nopeassa vauhdissa  ajatus, etta markkinakuri 
voi antaa pankeille  vahvat kannustimet  harjoittaa liiketoimintaansa luotettavasti, 
nayttaa varsin houkuttelevalta. 1  Introduction 
In  recent years there has been increasing discontent with traditional methods of 
banking supervision. On the one hand banking crises and failures have continued, 
with  difficulties in  the  Scandinavian countries, the  UK, US  and Japan among 
others.  On  the  other,  rapid  improvements  in  technology  and  products  and 
increasing operation across national borders have meant that the operations to be 
supervised  are  developing  at  an  incrcasing  rate.  Supervisors  can  respond  by 
seeking more information from banks, investing more effort in keeping pace with 
innovation and technology, and by cooperating more with each other. No  doubt 
this helps, but the costs of  supervision rise and those who seek to run excessive 
risks in the hope of  greater returns will still tend to remain one step ahead of  an 
external supervisor. 
At the same time, new ideas (or, more accurately, new versions of ideas) have 
been emerging which seek better incentives for banks to want to run themselves in 
a way which avoids excess risk taking and reduces the chance of failure or distress. 
There  is  a  danger  in  the  traditional  system  that  risk-taking  will  actually be 
encouraged, first, because the mere existence of close supervision can appear to be 
a guarantee in itself and, second, because there are implicit and explicit guarantees 
that depositors will be protected and that banks, particularly the larger ones, will 
not be allowed to fail. If  shareholders, managers and depositors feel themselves 
more  at  risk, both  financially and for their reputations, they will tend to  want 
manage risk rather better. 
Furthermore, many banks have sought to generate their reputation behind a 
cloak of  secrecy, avoiding disclosures for fear that such disclosures will reveal 
weaknesses. In  most other markets, suppliers go far more  out of  their way  to 
demonstrate their superiority over their competitors by  revealing their strengths 
and  adopting  voluntary  procedures  such  as  quality  standards  which  seek  to 
demonstrate a commitment to excellence. There is no reason why banks should be 
different in this regard. 
Several supervisory authorities have started to revise their procedures in the 
light of these new ideas and others are contemplating them. In an effort to assist 
these  developments,  this  discussion  paper  explains  the  rationale  for  the  new 
system and how it operates in the country which has gone furthest in this regard, 
New Zealand. 
In  some respects New  Zealand has more freedom to act than other OECD 
countries, so it may not be possible for others to follow some of the detail of the 
measures that have implemented. EU countries are bound by directives on capital 
adequacy and  deposit  insurance, for example.  However, all  the  principles  are 
applicable to other OECD countries and New  Zealand's  experience shows they 
can indeed be applied in practice. Examining what has happened in New Zealand 
indicates that there is an opportunity for other financial supervisors to increase the 
role of incentives and market disciplines to help reduce the risks both to the banks 
themselves and to the financial system as a whole. This paper therefore focuses on 
the transferable lessons in the hope that others will wish to pursue them further 
and, indeed, adopt them in the future. 2  The role of incentives and market discipline 
in reducing systemic risks 
Following ten years of  discussion and consultation, in 1996 the Reserve Bank of 
New  Zealand  introduced  a  new  system  of  banking  supervision  designed  to 
improve the prudential  operation of  banks  and  the  soundness of  the  financial 
system.  The  Reserve  Bank  sought,  by  imposing  requirements  for  the  public 
quarterly disclosure statements of their health on registered banks, to obtain much 
more discipline from the market on banks to run their businesses prudentially. 
Secondly  by  heightening  the  role  and  accountability of  the  directors  of  the 
registered banks  in  attesting  to  the  veracity  of  these  disclosures  it  hoped  to 
prove the management of  banks, in particular, their identification, monitoring 
and management of risks. 
As by products the Reserve Bank expected to reduce compliance costs for the 
registered banks and improve their business freedom. Furthermore it expected that 
this regime would reduce the risk to the taxpayer of  ever being called upon to 
rescue  a  bank.  By  eliminating  the  traditional  monopoly  of  information  that 
supervisors have on the banks'  financial condition this should both heighten the 
public  perception that  the  management and  directors of  a bank  have  the  sole 
responsibility  for  the  management  of  their  bank's  affairs  and  assist  future 
governments in resisting the pressures to rescue a bank in distress or insulate its 
creditors from losses. 
2.1  The need for banking supervision 
The changes to the system of banking supervision stem from an extended period of 
revision  of  the  regulation  of  the  company sector  and  financial  institutions  in 
particular.  Although  the  detailed changes resulted  from a  four year  review  of 
banking supervision, which began in late 1991, the basis for change was set out in 
the mid-1980s and the enabling legislation incorporated in the Reserve Bank Act 
of  1989. The review and the wholesale changes were motivated by the fact that 
traditional banking supervision arrangements in other countries, while costly, have 
not  been  very  effective  in  forestalling banking  crises  or  identifying  banks  in 
difficulty. 
While by  and large the Reserve Bank would prefer that banks be regulated 
like other trading bodies, there are some respects in which banks have a special 
position and hence require more explicit supervision. These include the traditional 
feature, that banks play a special role in the working of the economy by accepting 
short-run and very liquid deposits and providing business stability by lending long 
and hence creating assets which cannot readily be liquidated (George 1996). As a 
result they are vulnerable in a crisis; yet removing the vulnerability by changing 
their role would greatly reduce the value of banks to the economy. 
Furthermore, banking crises tend to occur at times of overall difficulty for the 
economy,  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that,  compared  to  some  other  financial 
institutions, the assets underpinning banks'  balance sheets, such as property, can 
be subject to wider swings in value. The appropriate valuation of assets relating to businesses, particularly  small businesses, will  depend upon  private information 
held by the bank and will be difficult to establish rapidly in a crisis. 
There are also particularly large externalities from bank failures. Not only is 
there the domino effect where a failure in one bank can cause problems for others 
and undermine the  public's  confidence in  the banking  system as  a whole but 
failures in the banking sector will knock on to the rest of the productive economy, 
reducing activity (Goodhart 1996b). 
It is thus important to understand that in making the changes to the system of 
banking supervision in New Zealand, the Reserve Bank was not washing its hands 
of  its responsibilities for the  soundness of  the financial system but  seeking to 
exercise  them  more  effectively. The  Reserve  Bank  continues  to  regulate  the 
system and increase the chance of soundness for the system by 
-  regulating entry, 
-  insisting on internationally accepted capital adequacy standards and 
-  requiring bank  structures that  create  incentives for bank  managements to 
ensure that their bank has good risk management systems. 
Disclosure alone is not  enough. There is  also continuing consultation with the 
senior management of  the registered banks and the Reserve Bank retains a wide- 
ranging capacity to respond to bank distress or failure where the stability of the 
banking system is threatened. 
At the same time the Reserve Bank is continuing to reduce the risks inherent 
in the operation of the financial system and, as an example, expects to have RTGS 
in  operation  around  the  end  of  1997, which  will  cover  over  90 percent  of 
transactions by value. Proposals for improved arrangements on netting (Zodgekar 
1996) are  also  in  progress.  Taken  together  these  measures  should  lessen  the 
exposure for other banks should any particular bank fail or get into difficulties. 
However,  as  explained  in  Section  3.3.1,  although  the  supervision 
arrangements are more detailed and comprehensive for banks the same principles 
regarding the importance of disclosure apply to legislation relating to all trading 
companies  and  to  other  financial  institutions  in  particular. Some parts  of  the 
regime are still being developed, such as that for insurance companies. 
2.2  Assigning responsibility and reducing moral hazard 
One of  the Reserve Bank's concerns with the traditional system has been that it 
blurs the responsibility of the management of the registered bank and that of the 
supervisor  in  ensuring  that  the  bank  is  well  run.  With  intrusive  supervision, 
including site visits, there will be an expectation, among both directors and the 
public, that if there is something wrong it will be picked up by the supervisors. 
Furthermore  there  will  be  a  greater  expectation  that  if,  despite  the  close 
supervision,  a bank  fails  or  gets  into  difficulty the  government  will  have  an 
obligation to intervene, as in  some sense this would  imply failure by  a public 
authority in its duly. This introduces a 'moral hazard'  that both depositors and 
those running banks will tend to take greater risks because there is a safety net 
limiting the adverse consequences of their actions for them. The more that depositors and bank directors have at risk the more effective 
are market disciplines likely to be. With the absence of deposit insurance in New 
Zealand those incentives for the depositor may be rather greater than in most other 
OECD  countries. However, it  is  not possible, even  in  these  circumstances, to 
eliminate moral hazard altogether. If  the central bank stands ready to prevent a 
spill-over into the rest of  the financial system and retail depositors also form a 
significant portion of  the country's electors there will always be the expectation 
that some form of safety net exists, however, strong the words denying it are. Even 
so, the new regime in New Zealand should clearly reduce any moral hazard that 
did exist. 
The OECD (1997) in their recent summary of the issues facing the financial 
sector put the point very clearly: 'A key and recurrent question is what induced 
banks to lend so heavily on the basis of real estate collateral particularly in the late 
stages of booms when prices had reached historically unprecedented levels. The 
experiences suggest that "moral hazard" incentives arising from deposit insurance 
or the implicit insurance afforded by the likelihood of state support in the event of 
failure of a large institution ("too  big to fail")  encouraged institutions to assume 
excessive  risks  (relative to returns  that  could reasonably have  been  expected) 
while lowering incentives for depositors to adequately monitor the risks of banks 
in which their funds were placed.' p. 27. 
They come to a similar conclusion  about the appropriate way  forward for 
supervision: 'Financial reform also necessitates fundamental changes in prudential 
policies,  in  particular  to  foster  effective  market  discipline  and  adequate  risk 
management  by  financial  institutions  including  strong  corporate  governance 
regimes;  to  improve  disclosure  and  transparency;  and  to  harmonise  oversight 
policies in similar market segments.' pp. 37- 38. 
2.3  Market discipline through disclosure of information 
The  quotation from the  OECD makes  it clear that  the  appropriate system for 
reducing  risk  includes  not  just  disclosure  but  good  corporate  governance. 
However, if there are to be effective pressures from the market they can only come 
about if the individual bank's actions are transparent and the relevant information 
is readily available. 
Naturally there will  be  some who view  such a change with  apprehension. 
Indeed there may be circumstances where a scheme of open disclosure could pose 
a disadvantage, for example, when  a bank is in temporary difficulties. Under a 
more closed system the problem would be known only to the supervisor (let us 
assume) and to the bank itself. The bank might then have time to sort the problem 
out  before  the  difficulty  became  publicly  known.  With  public  knowledge, 
depositors and creditors will attempt to protect themselves and that action in itself 
will worsen the problem, possibly turning a difficulty into failure. The knowledge 
that a safety net exists might reduce the chance of a 'run' on a bank, as all insured 
depositors would expect not to lose their money and there would be no need to try 
to rush to get to the front of the queue. 
It is not quite clear whether there is in practice a net disadvantage in these 
circumstances.  There might  well  be  more  disadvantages from a  system where public knowledge was more limited and hence rumour and misinformation were 
more prevalent. This could harm banks which did not in fact have difficulties but 
had disclosed insufficient information to satisfy market fears. The New  Zealand 
approach creates incentives for the bank to present solutions at an early stage and 
hence reduce the risk of a run on the bank. 
In any case the sheer knowledge that disclosure means that the opportunity to 
cover up problems is very limited may in itself lead the management of banks to 
act much earlier to head  off  problems or to implement more effective systems 
which will prevent such problems emerging in the first place. This in itself will 
tend to reduce the cost of finance for banks. 
It is not of  course realistic to expect that every ordinary depositor will be 
rushing  into the  nearest branch  of  every bank,  reading the  various disclosure 
statenlei~ts  with enorrrlous care and then making wise and well informed decisions 
about where to place their funds. It is the financial news media, financial analysts, 
investment advisers, major creditors and the competing banks who will digest and 
publish the results of  their analysis.  Most ordinary depositors will rely on this 
secondary information and the fact that it will be spread rapidly by word of mouth. 
The ability to make comparisons across banks has several advantages. The 
banks themselves have a twofold interest in each other's performance. First of all 
they have major transactions with each other through money markets and, second, 
they  want  their  own  positions  to  be  compared  favourably  with  those  of 
competitors. The fear that banks might be able to take advantage of  each other's 
wcakness as a result of  disclosure does not appear to have been translated into a 
problem in practice, although their positions are more transparent. 
It  is  already  clear from initial experience (Brash  1997) that  the  financial 
media and particularly competing banks are scrutinising disclosure statements and 
there has been some public comment about issues such as the breach of exposure 
limits. 
In any case the point of the system is to have prudently run banks in the first 
place and the main incentive structure and discipline lies firmly on directors and 
bank managers whose livelihoods and reputations are at stake if a problem arises. 
Brash  (1997)  claims  that  there  are  already  signs  that  directors  of  banks  are 
exercising  'greater  scrutiny of  their banks'  risk  positions'  (p.  11). Signing-off 
procedures by management need to be rigorous and transparent if non-executive 
directors,  in  particular,  are  to  be  willing  to  sign  the  quarterly  attestation. 
Furthermore  the  increased  auditing  requirement  helps  provide  a  greater 
independent confirmation of the banks' performance. 
3  The framework for bank regulation in 
New Zealand 
The changes to bank regulation in New Zealand have been harmonised as part of 
much wider revision of  the regulation of  trading activities in the economy. Most 
importantly the Reserve Bank's disclosure regime has been developed in tandem 
with  the  accounting  standards  for  financial  reporting  (Financial  Reporting 
Standard (FRS) 33). The Companies Office accepts the disclosure documents as 
meeting their requirements. Hence banks are spared multiple reporting standards within New  Zealand. Similarly these standards apply to other institutions so that 
disclosure is becoming a feature for the rest of the financial sector as well. 
3.1  Principles 
Bank regulation in New Zealand is covered by a number of very simple principles, 
which were derived after an extensive review which took place in the early 1990s. 
The new regime came into full effect from the first quarter of  1996. However, the 
framework for the Reserve Bank's regulation of the banking system is contained in 
Part V of the Reserve Bank Act 1989. Sections 67 to 156 cover the registration and 
prudential supervision of banks out of a total 192 sections in the Act. Indeed one 
of  the main reasons why it has been possible to implement the new  regime so 
successfully is that it has been introduced only after extensive consultation over 
many years. 
The principles supporting the regime can be sumrnarised as follows: 
-  only financial institutions  of  appropriate standing  and repute  can  become 
registered banks 
-  impediments to entry of qualifying institutions be kept at a minimum in order 
to encourage competition in the banking system 
-  that the incentives in the system encourage prudence on the part of registered 
banks and their customers and that normal market disciplines are not impeded 
Thus while outside interest has tended to focus on the disclosure regime which 
underpins  the  application  of  the  third  of  these  principles,  an  important 
precondition for its success is that there is a screening process to try to ensure that 
all  participating  banks  are  of  a  high  calibre  and  likely  to  follow  prudential 
behaviour  (section 73 of  the Act).  Furthermore these principles recognise that 
competition  can bring  significant benefits to users of  the  services provided by 
registered banks. New Zealand has lower margins and a higher quality and range 
of  services than  in  some other  small countries, which  may  in  part  be  due  to 
competitive pressure. It is the combination of these three aspects which provides 
the full flavour of the New Zealand approach. 
The series of criteria which the Reserve Bank applies in deciding whether to 
register a bank in the first place are straightforward but wide ranging. They entail 
that  the  Reserve  Bank  satisfy  itself  that  the  applicant's  business  will 
substantially consist of the borrowing and lending of money, or the provision 
of financial services, or both 
and that it have regard to: 
-  incorporation and ownership structure 
-  size of business 
-  ability to carry on business in a prudent manner 
-  standing of the applicant in the financial market 
-  law  and  regulatory  requirements  in  an  overseas  bank's  country  of 
domicile 
-  any other matters prescribed in regulations These points are developed in section 3.2 below but at this stage it is worth 
emphasising that these provisions include compliance with the Base1 criteria for 
capital adequacy, restriction of  connected lending exposure, separation from the 
other interests of the owners and adequate internal and accounting controls. 
The incentive system to encourage prudent behaviour has two main elements: 
-  a system of quarterly public disclosure statements and attestation by directors 
-  the  avoidance  as  far  as  possible  of  any  implicit  guarantees  against bank 
failures or of  the protection of creditors. Supervision is aimed at encouraging 
the soundness and efficiency of the financial system as a whole. 
In the event that a bank should fail - and there have been no bank failures in New 
Zealand in 'living memory'  (Ledingham 1995) - the Reserve Bank will seek to 
minimise damage to the financial system, in a way that does not involve taxpayer 
funding.  The Bank  has  extensive powers of  crisis management under the Act 
including  the  power  to  put  registered  banks  under  statutory  management  (a 
statutory manager has a broader set of  powers than a receiver). This aspect of 
having a crisis management system which not only has strong powers but seeks to 
limit moral hazard is a key pillar in the system. 
Furthermore, an open system of this form, with pre-commitment to respond in 
specified circumstances (as Goodhart  1996a puts it), is likely to minimise any 
possible potential conflict of interest between the supervision and monetary policy 
functions of the Reserve Bank. 
The remaining sections of this part of the paper therefore cover the three main 
ingredients of the New Zealand system 
-  conditions for registration 
-  disclosure statements 
-  crisis management 
3.2  Conditions for registration 
In fulfilling the requirement that the Reserve Bank be satisfied that the applicant's 
business will substantially consist of the borrowing and lending of money, or the 
provision of financial services, or both the applicant has to set out what business it 
intends  to  conduct, including  any business  through  subsidiaries.  There  are no 
requirements to provide particular financial services nor any explicit list of which 
services  are  deemed  to  be  'financial'.  Financial  services  are  defined  by  the 
common practice of  other  banks in  New  Zealand  and  other  similar  countries. 
Application would  be  refused where it was  clear that these  services were not 
primarily to be provided in New  Zealand. The Reserve Bank does not want to 
provide a refuge for banks which are seeking to evade the vigour of  supervision 
elsewhere by registering themselves in New Zealand. 3.2.1  Incorporation and ownership structure 
The Reserve Bank seeks to ensure that the ownership structure is such that the 
owners have incentives to monitor the bank's activities closely and influence its 
activities so as to keep a high level of soundness. This is likely to occur when the 
owners have a substantial stake in the bank and where they are the first to have to 
absorb any losses stemming from poor performance. 
Furthermore the incentive to encourage sound management will increase if 
the owners have reputation to lose from any problems which may arise. However, 
there does need to be sufficient separation between the board of directors and the 
owners as the interest of the bank and its owners may diverge. 
If  the application for registration is from an overseas not a local entity, they 
will have to demonstrate that 
-  they have bank status in their home jurisdiction 
-  that the supervision regime in that jurisdiction is adequate or that disclosure 
requirements or market disciplines exist 
Otherwise they will probably be required to incorporate locally. In any event the 
views of the supervisor of the parent would be sought before granting registration. 
3.2.2  Size of business 
Locally incorporated banks require minimum capital of NZ$15 million, while the 
branches of overseas banks are expected to operate off the capital on the parent's 
total balance sheet, which must exceed that sum. 
3.2.3  Ability to carry on business in a prudent manner 
For prudence the applicant must meet criteria for 
-  capital adequacy 
This criterion follows the Base1 framework. Thus, at all times, the minimum 
capital ratio is  8 per cent with  a tier  1 capital ratio of  4 per cent  for the 
banking group. However, regard is also paid to any restrictions on access to 
further capital and the need to hold capital for risks not covered by the Base1 
framework.  Furthermore  the  applicant  must  be  in  a  position  to  disclose 
information  on  capital adequacy both  for itself  and, where  applicable,  its 
parent. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Reserve  Bank  viewed  these  specific 
requirements  as  unnecessary  in  a  disclosure  regime  but  felt  they  were 
desirable  for  international  credibility.  'Although  the  Bank  considers  that 
disclosure alone, without minimum requirements, should provide  sufficient 
incentives for banks to at least adhere to the international norm of 8 per cent, 
it believes that retention of the capital requirement offers benefits in terms of international credibility, at little, if any, marginal cost to banks.' (RBNZ 1995, 
p.76)  However,  the  Reserve  Bank  took  careful  account  of  international 
opinion in its consultations before implementing the new regime. 
It is interesting that the US Fed (as set out in Kupiec and O'Brien (1995) 
for example) is adopting an approach where systems operated by the banks 
themselves may give a better indication of the specific sorts of risks that they 
face, in particular, because of  the ability to take full account of  the inter- 
relatiunship among risks. The Base1 Committee (1997) seems to be moving in 
this direction. 
-  loan concentration and risk exposures 
Applicants have to show that they have adequate mechanisms for monitoring 
and preventing excessive exposure to risks from single parties or sectors and 
that  they will  be  able to comply with  the  disclosure requirements in  this 
regard. Otherwise there is a danger that a single party or groups of  related 
parties could bring down the bank. 
-  separation from other interests of the owners 
(This  section  does  not  apply  to  branches  or  guaranteed  subsidiaries  of 
overseas banks  because  creditors will  have  a  claim  on  the  assets  of  the 
parent.) Applicants are required to have at least two independent directors and 
a  non-executive  chairperson in  order  to  ensure  that  there  is  a  degree  of 
objective scrutiny of: 
-  exposure to the parent or related parties 
-  exposures to unrelated parties undertaken at the request of the parent 
-  other matters where the interests of the bank and parent or management 
could conflict. 
Secondly exposure to related parties (excluding risks layoffs to a parent bank) 
must be limited to 75 per cent of tier  1 capital and within in this limit, aggregate 
exposure to non-bank connected parties to 15 per cent of tier 1 capital. In addition, 
banks  must not adopt a constitution which would allow directors to act in the 
interests of a holding company where to do so would conflict with the interests of 
the bank in New Zealand to the detriment of creditors. 
-  internal controls and accounting systems 
For overseas banks these requirements will normally be met by adopting the 
parent's systems but elsewhere the Reserve Bank will need to be satisfied of 
the  nature  of  the  controls  especially  in  areas  outside  the  bank's  normal 
experience. 
The  nature of  the corporate governance of  the bank is  thus  a key concern  in 
determining its suitability for registration. 3.2.4  Standing of the applicant in the financial market 
Unless  the  institution,  executive  board  members,  senior  staff  or  owners have 
proven good experience in financial markets it is unlikely that the application will 
be approved. However, there is no 'fitness or properness' test for a bank's directors 
and senior management. It is the role of the shareholders to appoint directors and 
of  the directors to appoint the senior management. Here the concern is with the 
standing of the bank as a whole - clearly the presence of a notorious individual in 
a position of trust would call the organisation into question. 
3.2.5  Law and regulatory requirements in an overseas bank's country 
of domicile 
Where the requirements of  the parent's supervisors or the legal framework in the 
home jurisdiction may cause problems in New Zealand the applicant may have to 
be locally incorporated. (This might include preference for foreign creditors for 
example.) 
3.2.6  Any other matters prescribed in regulations 
(Currently none.) 
3.3  Disclosure 
The quarterly disclosure statements are the key ingredient of the new supervisory 
regime.  Instead  of  relying  on  the  supervisor  to  ensure  that  the  appropriate 
prudential standards are being applied the onus is now on the banks themselves not 
just  to  ensure  that  these  standards  are  being  met  but  to  demonstrate  to  the 
satisfaction of the public that they are. The important feature of disclosure is its 
transparency.  If  the  registered bank  wishes  to  maintain  the  confidence  of  its 
depositors  and  shareholders then  it needs  to  demonstrate that  it is  running its 
business  prudently. Indeed,  since  this  is  a  competitive  market  there  is  every 
incentive to try to show that the quality of  the bank exceeds that of others. Thus 
the disclosure statements should: 
-  sharpen the  incentives  for the management and  directors to  ensure  sound 
management - particularly, effective systems to identify, monitor and manage 
risks 
-  increase the  market's  ability to  assess  and  compare  the  performance  and 
soundness of banks 
-  strengthen the accountability of management and directors of banks 
-  provide depositors and other bank customers with improved information with 
which to determine where they should bank. The disclosure statement itself (see Table 1 for an example) includes information 
on: 
-  the income statement and balance sheet (including a 5 year summary of key 
financial data) 
-  directors and their interests 
-  asset quality and provisioning 
-  the number of  large exposures (including interbank exposures) as measured 
relative to the bank's equity 
-  related party exposures as measured relative to the bank's tier one capital 
-  sectoral exposures 
-  capital adequacy, including off-balance-sheet items 
-  market risk exposures 
-  credit rating (if held). 
These statements have to be certified by the directors of the bank on each occasion 
as being neither false nor misleading. In addition directors are required to provide 
an attestation that the bank has adequate systems in place to monitor and control 
risks and that these systems are being properly applied. Should these attestations 
be found to be false the penalties are severe: 
-  a fine of up to $NZ25,000 
-  a jail term of up to 3 years 
-  unlimited personal civil liability for losses sustained by reason of subscribing 
to any debt security (including bank deposits) issued by the bank in reliance 
on false or misleading information contained in a disclosure statement 
The statements are subject to external audit twice a year. 
3.3.1  The rationale behind disclosure 
As  far  as  possible  these  disclosure statements have been  designed to fit  with 
modern accounting practice and the legislation puts the treatment of directors of 
banks very much on a par with the treatment of directors of other companies that 
issue  securities  under  the  terms  of  the  Companies  Act  1993,  the  Financial 
Reporting  Act  1993, the  Securities Act  1978 and  Securities Regulations  1983 
(Mortlock 1996). Indeed, bringing financial accounting and auditing practices into 
line  were  an  essential  part  of  ensuring  that  disclosure  statements  could  be 
externally verified to a standard that  would  satisfy shareholders and depositors 
(and the Reserve Bank as supervisor). 
Although the disclosure requirements might seem onerous at first blush, they 
are designed to do no more than encourage directors to undertake their existing 
responsibilities  conscientiously. It  makes  directors  accountable;  it  encourages 
them to be well informed about the activities of the bank and the risks to which it 
may be exposed. Tn  particular, it encourages them to make sure that the systems in 
place in thc bank are adequate to monitor and Inanage those risks. 
In taking this last step, the Reserve Bank has sought to get round a problem 
which  entraps  more  traditional  supervision systems, which  lay  down  a  set  of procedures that should be followed. It is easy to find out whether the bank has 
actually put the procedures in place but it is very difficult, as an outside observer, 
to find out how well they are followed and whether it is the spirit of their purpose 
which has been implemented. The system of incentives encourages directors and 
managers to satisfy themselves that both the letter and the spirit are being followed 
as they will be held accountable if there is a problem. 
Since these statements should correspond closely to the quarterly information 
that  banks  would  wish  to  produce  to  ensure  their  own  good  operation  the 
compliance costs should be reduced compared with other supervisory regimes - 
although  no  doubt  there  are  transition  costs  as  the  new  arrangements  are 
implemented.  The Reserve Bank  has  stopped charging banks  for the  costs  of 
supervision and banks now have increased business freedom through the reduction 
of  direct controls. The costs of  supervision are thus  reduced  directly in  three 
respects: -  the costs to the supervisor are lower, the compliance cost for the bank is 
likely to be lower and there is likely to be an efficiency gain. Should a crisis occur 
it  is  unlikely  that  the  supervisory costs  will  be  much  affected but  since  the 
intention is to reduce the chance of such a crisis the expected value of these costs 
should also fall. 
Although banks expressed fears of  increased costs in advance they have not 
reported any substantial increases now  the regime has bedded in. Much of  the 
information now disclosed is similar to that provided previously in private to the 
Reserve  Bank.  Furthermore,  anyone,  including  banks,  issuing  securities  was 
required by the Securities Commission to produce an extensive Prospectus - an 
obligation now rescinded for registered banks. 
The  system is  particularly designed to  take  full  advantage of  the  role  of 
independent directors. (The disclosure statement itself covers conflicts of interest.) 
Such directors bring a different perspective to the management of the business. 
This  additional and, probably, more  objective scrutiny should help  ensure that 
dealings with controlling shareholders and related parties are not contrary to the 
interests of the bank in New Zealand. They will be particularly concerned to be 
certain that the risk management mechanisms and internal controls are effective as 
they are not party to the day-to-day activities of the bank. For example, one would 
expect that the board would want to have an effective audit committee chaired by a 
non-executive director (Goodhart 1996a, p. 64, sets out a similar suggestion). 
These arrangements will encourage banks to appoint directors who are not 
only skilled in their own right and have established reputations but who have an 
incentive  to  see  that  the  bank's  management  has  the  necessary  skills  and 
experience.  By  having  these  reputational  penalties  and  encouraging  a  regime 
which makes early identification of problems more likely it is hoped to provide at 
least some safeguard against 'go for broke' strategies (Kupiec and O'Brien  1995). 
That worry is that managers, having breached the criteria for prudence, have no 
greater downside penalty from following increasingly risky strategies. In the New 
Zealand regime the penalties for trying to cover up and get through a difficulty 
may be greater than those from disclosing an impending problem in the first place. 
What is being  sought here  is  a 'contract'  between the  supervisor  and the 
registered bank, where the incentives are such that, for the minimum cost, the bank 
keeps the risks of  imprudent behaviour below some minimum acceptable to the 
supervisor. (This is  analogous at  one remove to the  sorts of  optimal  contracts 
discussed by Diamond (1984), inter alia, between lenders and borrowers, where the borrower is faced by a set of disincentives to fail to produce the required return 
for the lender.) Registration criteria help screen out high risks and the range of 
risks to be covered in the disclosure statement help ensure that the identifiable 
facets of risk are covered. Managing the risk is achieved through a combination of 
specified  minima  and  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary  disincentives  where  the 
required  standards cannot be expressed in  any  such directly quantitative form. 
Market disciplines are likely to be more effective than threat of  fines and other 
similar penalties. It is not possible to draw the appropriate line for prudent minima 
or for the appropriate level of  the disincentives with any precision. Furthermore, 
supervisors  wish  to  avoid  conducting  any  experiments that  demonstrate what 
incentives are insufficient. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's system is thus not 
designed to test the margin of adequacy but to operate at a level where risks are 
low at the best international standards for supervision. 
3.3.2  The nature of the disclosure statements 
The  disclosure  statements  are  published  in  two  forms.  A  Key  Information 
Summary is required to be  displayed prominently in every bank branch and is 
available on demand. As its name implies it contains the core information in the 
statement presented in a manner that is accessible to the ordinary bank customer. It 
includes: 
-  the bank's credit rating (or statement that it does not have one) 
-  capital ratios 
-  information  on  peak  exposure  concentration,  asset  quality,  shareholder 
guarantees (if any) and profitability. 
The other publication is the General Disclosure Statement which contains the full 
list  of  information  described  above  in  a  manner  aimed  principally  at  the 
professional analyst. 
These documents can vary fairly substantially between the banks in terms of 
presentation. The KIS  is usually two to four pages in length but the GDSs are 
much more substantial (AN2 48 pages, BNZ 66 pages, Countrywide 41 pages, 
Westpac 52 pages for the six months ended February or March  1997). Table 1 
reproduces a short form GDS published by the National Bank for the three months 
to end March 1997 (this has been chosen simply because it is the shortest). 
It is the information on  peak  exposures that is revealing, compared to the 
common practice of  showing end quarter values, which can be managed much 
more readily. Furthermore, it is the inclusion of information on market risk for the 
whole  range  of  the  banks'  activities  which  takes  the  disclosure  substantially 
beyond other regimes. 3.3.3  The treatment of market risks 
The Reserve Bank  has  gone rather  further than  the Base1 accord in requiring 
disclosure of Value at Risk not just for the banks' trading book but for the whole 
of their balance sheet (Harrison 1996). It has set out a common framework for the 
calculation  of  risk  so that  banks  can  be  compared  and  assessed relative to  a 
standard. (Banks can use their own systems to measure exposures provided that 
this does not generate results materially below those obtained from applying the 
Reserve Bank's standard.) The market risks cover interest rate, exchange rate and 
equity exposures. The Base1 'standard model'  forms the basis for the assessment, 
with interest risk decomposed into directional, yield curve and basis risks. Both 
end of quarter and peak risks during the quarter have to be disclosed. 
The Reserve Bank has been  opposed  to laying down uniform quantitative 
risks  limits. If  such limits  are to be  effective in  restricting risk  in  all normal 
circumstances they  would  tend  to  have  to  be  set  rather  low,  inhibiting  some 
prudent  business.  While  when  they  are normally set  fairly high  so as  only to 
exclude  imprudent  behaviour  they  will  implicitly  offer  an  endorsement  of 
behaviour  up to those limits, which could in  some circumstances result  in the 
taking on of undue risk. The problems of moral hazard are thus reintroduced and 
the  Reserve  Bank  has  limited  such  ratios  to  the  minimum  number  that 
international standards require. 
Similarly, the  Reserve Bank does not prescribe particular  internal control 
mechanisms. If  it did it would again face the twin dangers: - that such controls 
might  be  thought  to  be  adequate  in  all  circumstances  and  hence  allow  the 
emergence of  greater risks than banks would be prepared to tolerate of  their own 
volition; that such controls would be felt mandatory and hence their imposition 
might impose unnecessary costs on some banks, whose business does not require 
them. 
By following this value at risk approach the New Zealand supervision system 
should be well adjusted to the advances being reported (see Jackson et al. 1996, for 
example) in bank based systems which can be 'back-tested' for accuracy compared 
with the unadjusted Base1 criteria. By using a disclosure route it is possible for 
concerns  over  capital  adequacy to  be  expressed  before  the  bank  reaches  any 
specific  limit. As  Goodhart (1996b) points  out  there is no  material difference 
between capital adequacy of 8.0 and 7.999 per cent. Triggers for concern should be 
progressive and take into account an evaluation of the bank's whole business, as 
well as the wider state of the financial system and the economy as a whole at the 
time (Benston and Kaufman  1994). Disclosure enables concern to be expressed 
with varying intensity at any juncture. 
3.4  Crisis management 
A key feature of the New Zealand regime is that the idea of any implicit guarantee 
for registered banks  should be  minimised. Unlike  most  OECD countries New 
Zealand does not have any system of  depositor protection, even for small retail 
deposits. Nevertheless, it is impossible to dismiss the idea that the government 
might step in the event of the failure of  a major retail bank, however much the authorities wish to precommit themselves not to act in that manner. The system is 
designed to permit individual banks to fail, whatever their size, and purely to try to 
make sure that the knock on consequences for the financial system as a whole are 
minimised. 
It is important to distinguish between liquidity and solvency problems. The 
Reserve Bank has the power to provide whatever liquidity is necessary to maintain 
the confidence in individual banks and hence the system as a whole. This guards 
against  the  consequences  of  shocks, either to  the  economy  as  a  whole  or  to 
individual banks, which have a short run adverse effect on liquidity, spilling out 
into a wider problem. (It would also prevent market participants driving some of 
their number into difficulty by  cornering markets.) However, the Reserve Bank 
will not provide liquidity to banks which are either insolvent or likely to become 
insolvent and will instead recommend to the Minister of Finance that the bank be 
placed under statutory management. Such a recommendation would also be made 
if a bank in difficulty refused to consult, comply with a direction or behaved in a 
manner prejudicial to the soundness of the financial system. 
The  statutory  manager  has  wider  powers  than  a  liquidator.  There  is  a 
moratorium on legal proceedings. The manager can suspend payment on money 
owing and can convert a branch of  an overseas bank into a locally incorporated 
entity. The statutory manager is subject to  direction by  the Reserve Bank. The 
prime regard of the statutory manager is the need to maintain public confidence in 
the  operation  and  soundness  of  the  financial  system and  to  avoid  significant 
damage  to  the  financial  system. However,  consistent  with  that,  they  are  also 
required to try to resolve the difficulties as soon as possible while preserving the 
position and maintaining the ranking of creditors' claims. 
The  more  common  occurrence will,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  not  be  crises  but 
breaches  of  the  capital  adequacy requirements. Here  (RBNZ  1995, p.  78)  the 
Reserve Bank has implemented a version of  what Goodhart (1996, p. 647) has 
described  as  'a pre-committed graduated series  of  responses in  face of  capital 
erosion.' 
If tier 1 capital falls below 4 per cent or total capital below 8 per cent of risk- 
weighted exposures a bank must submit a plan for restoring its capital at least 
to the minimum to the Reserve Bank and to publish that plan  as soon as 
possible in a disclosure statement. 
The plan would have to include 
-  no distributions  are made to shareholders till the minimum position is 
regained 
-  no increase in the exposure to a related party from that prevailing at the 
time of the breach 
If  tier  1 capital falls below  3 per cent gross credit exposures must not be 
increased above the level prevailing at the time of the breach. 
The Reserve Bank can, if necessary, enforce this policy by giving a 'direction' 
to the bank under the provisions of section 11 1 of the Reserve Bank Act. 3.5  Developments 
The new regime has been in place for less than two years so some refinements are 
to be expected as both the Reserve Bank and the registered banks gain experience 
in its operation. Indeed the Reserve Bank announced before the new scheme was 
implemented that a review would be undertaken in the light of experience. 
Some limited changes may occur to eliminate unnecessary differences from 
the  new  financial  reporting  standard, FRS  33,  that  has  now  been  published. 
Similarly as international experience with Value at Risk measurement develops 
some changes here may be expected. There is clearly a problem for banks who 
have to report to a home country regulator as well as to the RBNZ, using different 
VaR measures (the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of 
Australia are the principal other central banks involved). The problem is worse if 
the bank is using yet another different model for internal purposes and this could 
result in an increase in compliance costs. (Even where banks do use a different for 
internal management, they have chosen to disclose using the RBNZ VaR  model, 
partly for comparability and partly because of the difficulty in explaining a VaR 
model and its qualities in a disclosure document.) 
However,  comments  thus  far do not  indicate the need  for  any  substantial 
changes. The extensive period  of consultation  dealt with many of the points  of 
prior concern that the banks had raised. Some anomalies remain. Small registered 
banks, whose failure would have little systemic significance have to make a full 
return, while large near-banks, whose failure would be of consequence, have less 
exacting disclosure and risk requirements. 
It  is not  clear  whether  the Reserve  Bank  will  include  users  of  disclosure 
documents in their review  of  the scheme.  Rating  agencies have welcomed  the 
disclosure  but  very  few  General  Disclosure  Statements  have  been  requested 
beyond those sent to counterparties and the media. 
4  How far is the New Zealand system 
transferable? 
New Zealand is a small country with only 19 registered banks all but one of whom, 
with a very small market share, are foreign owned. It is thus relatively easy to keep 
tabs on the whole of the financial system and to be relatively well informed about 
what if  going on. However, it is sometimes argued (see Brash  1997) that New 
Zealand  is  to  some  extent  piggy-backing  on  the  more  traditional  supervision 
regimes in other countries as home country regulators normally require reports on 
the whole operations of the banking group, including those in New Zealand. 
To  some  extent  this  is  true,  in  that  if  the  supervisors  in  the  parent's 
jurisdiction were to do a poor job and allow the parent to fold the chances are that 
the New Zealand subsidiary and certainly a New Zealand branch would fold with 
it. New Zealand is thus reliant on adequate supervision of  the parent. However, 
this reliance only extends to supervision within New Zealand in a rather limited 
sense.  The  Reserve  Bank  will  normally  place  a  lot  of  stock by  the  parent's 
supervisor's views of the standing of the institution and of the bank's compliance with the requirements imposed by the home supervisor. However, if the Reserve 
Bank were not able to place that reliance it would have to make up its own mind. 
However, the success of  the system within New  Zealand does not rely on 
external  supervision  but  on  the  rules  for  registration,  disclosure  and  crisis 
management. 
Secondly the position would be very different if there were a large number of 
New  Zealand registered banks  which  were  doing substantial business  in  third 
markets. In these cases the Reserve Bank would in effect be supervising a parent 
and it is likely that the nature of disclosure would have to change to take account 
of substantial overseas operations. 
Thirdly, it is worth noting that financial markets in New Zealand are highly 
developed. Information about  financial institutions and those who  run  them is 
good. There is fortunately no history of  corrupt or suspect behaviour. Where a 
central bank has far more doubts about the quality of those wishing to run banks or 
the public lacks confidence then a more intrusive regime and a wider system of 
guarantees may be  appropriate. The nature and  adequacy of  corporate law, the 
adequacy of  accounting standards, auditing requirements and even the integrity of 
the accounting profession will all affect the efficiency of a disclosure based regime 
- as indeed will freedom and ownership of the press. As in so many circumstances 
this is a matter of weighing up the costs and benefits of the different regimes and 
there is no reason to expect that precisely the same conclusion will be drawn in 
each  jurisdiction.  Where  the  banking  system  is  largely  owned  by  the  state, 
disclosure may be less meaningful as the implicit guarantees will be substantial. 
Even so a robust disclosure regime may encourage better risk management. 
Furthermore the regulation of the banking sector has to be balanced against 
the regulation of closely related sectors. If the regulation of banks is too harsh, in 
relative terms, then some of the task of intermediation undertaken by banks will 
tend to migrate to less regulated sectors. This migration may itself tend to lessen 
the  stability of  both  the financial sector as  a whole and the banking  sector in 
particular. In  New  Zealand  the  whole  system of  financial regulation  has  been 
developing  in parallel, with  some steps, outside the banking sector, still to be 
completed. 
Lastly, regime changes can always lead to uncertainty. Even if a disclosure 
based regime might be more effective in the long run, introducing it at a time of 
fragility in the financial system might be ill advised. 
It is also worth noting that while this paper may appear to have focused on 
systemic risk, this does not  mean  investor protection is neglected by  the New 
Zealand  approach. The absence of  any public or private insurance schemes for 
depositor protection does not mean that depositors are not protected. The system is 
designed to provide sufficiently strong incentives to prudential management that 
such  schemes  are unnecessary.  Indeed,  it  is  argued  that  the  presence  of  such 
schemes would themselves weaken the incentives and increase the chances of  a 
failure and hence the need to bail out depositors. 
Not all jurisdictions might feel that they had the confidence to operate such a 
scheme. Ultimately the fallout from losses by retail depositors will be political, as 
they are also electors. As Goodhart (1996b) points out (p. 27) there is one sense in 
which  the  contract between  depositors  and banks  differs from that  with  other 
transactions. Here one cannot inspect the goods before parting with the money. The depositors part with their money now in return for the promise of more later 
under various conditions. 
In  some respects it is the treatment of deposit insurance which provides the 
clearest  difference between the New  Zealand regime and the progress towards 
greater disclosure occurring in other OECD countries. The New  Zealand system 
does offer a substitute for deposit insurance in that the incentives in the system 
should encourage more prudent behaviour by the banks and depositors in the first 
place. 
Others (Diamond and Dyvbig  1983, for example) have suggested that  the 
lender of  last resort facility to deal with  liquidity problems for banks  that  are 
basically solvent but faced with a crisis of confidence can act as an alternative to 
deposit insurance. There it is hoped that the existence of the facility will provide 
the necessary confidence and that hence runs would not occur in the first place. As 
with  government backed  deposit insurance  schemes, where the  payout  can  be 
covered by taxation, no cost is incurred if the facility is not called on. (There are of 
course severe practical problems in distinguishing between liquidity and solvency 
problems in a crisis as action has to be swift. The quality of the decisions made 
will depend upon the accuracy of  the knowledge available to the central bank at 
the time.) 
However, comparable economies are not  starting from a clean slate. Most 
have deposit insurance already. It is probably unlikely that countries with deposit 
insurance would feel inclined to remove it, although changes in form to focus on 
the depositors with the greatest difficulty in obtaining information on the risks to 
banks, i.e. small retail depositors, might occur. In no way does this mean that a 
disclosure regime only makes sense if  there is no deposit insurance. All of the 
other incentives on directors, shareholders and non-insured depositors still apply, 
as do the incentives for competitors to highlight difficulties - they may have to 
pick up some of the bill should there be a call on the deposit insurance - and for 
analysts and the media to search for value and for stories. 
In  choosing an  appropriate regime one needs to balance  out  the costs.  A 
detailed  regulatory  regime  would  impose  heavy  compliance  costs  on  the 
participating banks and to this would have to be added the costs of the regulator 
(which could be charged back to the banks as used to be the case in New Zealand) 
or financed out of more general taxation (for example through central bank surplus 
not passed  on to the taxpayer). To  these costs need  to be added two forms of 
efficiency  loss.  The first  stems from the  need  to  maintain  any  excess margin 
against risk but the second relates to the need to resort to higher cost methods of 
finance outside the banking system. These costs may be not just in terms of direct 
costs but flexibility as well. 
Against this must be offset the increased security of the system as a whole. In 
so far as the risks are perceived to be lower then this will have a downward effect 
on borrowing costs. However, the largest cost normally only occurs in the event of 
failure. These failures are fortunately sufficiently few that it is very difficult to 
build up a clear assessment of the size of this cost. That cost extends beyond the 
direct cost, in terms of  lost deposits or insurance paid out, to the reputational cost 
to the system as a whole and higher costs that will be incurred until confidence 
returns. The higher the protection for banks then the greater the incentive to use 
other forms of finance and the risk may be transferred rather than reduced. In the New  Zealand case the  direct costs  are clearly reduced by  the  new 
system and efficiency is likely to increase as banks are able to take a more flexible 
view in assessing risks. The Reserve Bank clearly thinks that the risks of  bank 
failure are also reduced. It  is difficult to prove that one way  or the other. The 
absence  or  occurrence  of  failure  under  one  regime  will  only  have  clear 
implications for the other if  it is possible  to point to events which would not 
otherwise  have  happened.  For  example,  the  supervisor  may  have  detected  a 
problem or the disclosure regime may have led a bank to implement improved 
procedures  which closed an opportunity for a dangerous risk. Such unrecorded 
events are either unknowable in principle or not publicised in practice. There must, 
however, be a supposition in favour of the New Zealand changes, suggesting that 
not merely may the risks have been reduced but the costs reduced as well. In so far 
as this has implications for investment there could be small 'supply-side' benefits 
for economic growth as well as the static efficiency gain. 
Concluding remarks 
It is easy to exaggerate the differences between the New Zealand scheme and that 
in place in many other jurisdictions. One way to view it is that the New Zealand 
arrangements are a more direct interpretation of  the principles that others also 
espouse,  take  the  Bank  of  England  (1997)  'Standards  for  Supervisors',  for 
example. Paragraph 4 reads 'We are predisposed to market solutions, and believe 
in  the  benefits  of  fair  competition  and  market  disciplines.'  The  latest  Base1 
Banking Supervision Committee Proposals follow  a similar line - 'supervisors 
should encourage and pursue market discipline by encouraging good corporate 
governance and enhancing market transparency and surveillance.' (p. 3.) Again on 
page 4 it suggests 'Supervision cannot, and should not, provide an assurance that 
banks will not fail. In a market economy failures are part of risk taking.'  and on 
page 10, 'EfSective market discipline depends on an adequate flow of information 
to market participants, appropriate financial incentives to reward well-managed 
institutions and arrangements that ensure that investors are not insulated from the 
consequences of their decisions.' 
Sufficiently  flexible  powers  are  necessary  in  order  to  effect  an  eficient 
resolution of problems in banks. Where problems are remediable, supervisors will 
normally  seek  to  identify  and  implement  solutions  that  fully  address  their 
concerns, where they are not, the prompt and orderly exit of institutions that are no 
longer able to meet  supervisory requirements is a necessary part of  an efficient 
financial system. Forbearance, whether or  not  the  result  of  political  pressure, 
normally leads to worsening problems and higher resolution costs.' 
Some prefer to view  the New  Zealand regime is being, if  anything, rather 
towards one end of a spectrum of possible approaches to banking supervision than 
representing a complete paradigm shift which  others would  find it  difficult to 
emulate (Nicholl 1996). What they have done is unwind the process that George 
(1996)  notes  -  that  there  is  a  danger  that  every  time  there  is  a  failure  of 
supervision there is a temptation ratchet regulation a notch tighter. There is still an 
essential role for supervisors to play and the Reserve Bank still thinks it important 
to publish annual surveys of the banking system in the Reserve Bank Bulletin each June. It is able to flag developments which it can see in the system as  a whole 
which may not appear from the scrutiny of individual disclosure statements. For 
example, as OECD (1997) put it: 'Caution flags should be raised by the regulatory 
authorities when  financial  market participants begin  to  assemble on  the  same 
village green.' p. 38. 
New  Zealand's experience with the new  regime will be  studied closely by 
supervisors in  other countries. Subject to the requirements for capital adequacy 
and depositor protection, there will be considerable incentives for the authorities in 
the EU countries to increase the role of market disciplines and of public disclosure 
as  increasing  cross  border  operation  makes  it  more  difficult  for  national 
supervisors to keep track of the operations of large international banks. 
Stumbling blocks for the implementation of more disclosure would be posed 
by  the  principle  of  home  country  supervision  as  substantial  differences  in 
requirements faced could emerge for competitors in the same market. As a result 
banks  might  feel  encouraged  to  change  the jurisdiction  that  applies  to  them. 
Secondly harmonisation with accounting standards, regulation of  the rest of  the 
financial  sector  and  regulators  of  other  aspects  of  banks'  behaviour  may  be 
difficult. 
Thirdly,  substantial  changes  in  legislation  may  be  required  if  crisis 
management  powers  are  to  be  strengthened to  make  credible  the  threat  that 
insolvent banks will be allowed to fail and the viable business restructured and 
transfered (see Liuksila 1997). Implementation of the new regime in New Zealand 
was  greatly facilitated because the Reserve Bank  already had  all the necessary 
powers under the 1989 Act. With a small exception (Reserve Bank Amendment 
Act  1995) new legislation was not required. Registration and crisis management 
powers were already in place and the disclosure regime could be implemented by 
Orders-in-Council, without  recourse  to  parliament.  However,  given  that  New 
Zealand already has the necessary legislation and orders in place, other countries 
have  a  precedent to  follow  and  could  draw  up  the  legislation  they  need  and 
implement a regime involving more market discipline much more rapidly than in 
New Zealand, even after allowing time for adequate consultation with the banks. Table 1.  Disclosure Document 
The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
GENERAL SHORT FORM DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
For the three months ended 3 1 March 1997 
GENERAL MATTERS 
Name: 
The  National  Bank  of  New  Zealand  Limited  (referred  to  in  full  or  as  the 
'Registered Bank') 
Address for service-.  170- 186 Featherston Street Wellington 
The  National  Bank  of  New  Zealand  Limited  was  originally  incorporated  in 
England  under  the  Companies  Act  1862  on  14  August  1872  and  further 
incorporated in New Zealand under The National Bank of  New Zealand (Limited) 
Act 1873. Pursuant to the National Bank of New Zealand Act 1985, The National 
Bank  of  New  Zealand  Limited  was  deemed  to  be  incorporated  under  the 
Companies Act 1955 on 19 June 1985 and pursuant to the National Bank of New 
Zealand Limited Act  1985 of  the United Kingdom, The National Bank of  New 
Zealand Limited ceased to be incorporated in England. 
The  National  Bank  of  New  Zealand  Limited was  re-registered under  the 
Companies Act 1993 on 20 December 1995. 
Ultimate parent bank:  Ultimate holding company: 
Lloyds Bank Plc  Lloyds TSB Group plc 
7 1 Lombard Street  7 1 Lombard Street 
London EC3P 3BS  London EC3P 3BS 
England  England 
CREDIT RATING 
The  National  Bank  of  New  Zealand  Limited  has  undergone  credit  ratings by 
Standard & Poor's (Australia) Pty Limited. 
There has been no change in the credit ratings in the preceding two years. The 
latest credit ratings are as follows: 
Long term New Zealand dollars  AA- 
Subordinated debt New Zealand dollars  A+ Standard & Poor's (Australia) Pty Limited credit rating scale definitions 
Long Term Ratings 
AAA rated corporations have an extremely strong capacity for timely repayment of 
debt obligations. 
AA  rated corporations have a very strong capacity for timely repayment of debt 
obligations. They differ only from AAA status because margins of protection may 
not  be  as  large  or  because  protection  elements  may  be  subject  to  greater 
fluctuation. 
A rated corporations have a strong capacity to meet debt obligations in a timely 
manner. Such corporations may be somewhat more susceptible to adverse changes 
in their environment, or margins of protection for the lender may be lower than for 
more highly rated corporations. 
BBB  rated  corporations have  a  satisfactory capacity to meet  debt  obligations. 
Protection  levels  are  more  likely  to  be  weakened  by  adverse  changes  in 
circumstances and economic conditions than for borrowers in more highly rated 
categories. 
BB rated corporations' ability to pay interest and repay principal is only adequate 
and is likely to be affected over time by adverse economic changes. 
B rated corporations are not highly protected as to their ability to pay interest and 
repay principal when due. 
CCC rated  corporations have poor protection levels. There is uncertainty with 
regard  to  the  corporation's  industry  or  some  other  feature  of  its  business. 
Speculative characteristics exist and debt is not well safe guarded. 
CC is typically applied to debt subordinated to senior debt that is assigned an 
actual or implied CCC rating. 
C is assigned where there is a high risk of  default, or where default may have 
occurred. 
D rated corporations are in default. 
GUARANTORS 
There  are no  guarantees over the  material  obligations of  any member  of  The 
National Bank of New Zealand Limited and its subsidiaries (the 'Banking Group'). CONDITIONS OF REGISTRATION 
The conditions of  registration of  The National Bank  of  New  Zealand Limited 
issued by The Reserve Bank of New Zealand on 1 January 1996 and applying at 
the date of this General Disclosure Statement are as follows: 
(1)  That the Banking Group complies with the following requirements: 
-  Capital of the Banking Group is not less than 8 per cent of  risk weighted 
exposures 
-  Tier one capital of the Banking Group is not less than 4 per cent of risk 
weighted exposures. 
-  Capital of the Banking Group is not less than NZ$15 million. 
For the purposes of this condition of registration, capital, tier one capital and 
risk weighted exposures shall be calculated in accordance with the Reserve 
Bank  of  New  Zealand  document entitled  'Capital Adequacy  Framework' 
(BS2) dated 1 January 1996. 
(2)  That the business of the Banking Group consists of, or substantially consists 
of  the borrowing and lending of  money, or the provision of  other Financial 
services, or both. 
(3)  That aggregate credit exposures (net of  specific provisions and gross of  set- 
offs) of the Banking Group to all connected persons do not exceed 75 per cent 
of the Banking Group's tier one capital and that, within this limit, aggregate 
credit exposures (net of specific provisions and gross of set-offs) to non-bank 
connected persons do not exceed 15 per cent of the banking Group's tier one 
capital. 
(4)  That the  board  of  the  Registered Bank  contains  at  least  two  independent 
directors. In this context an independent director is a director who is not an 
employee  of  the  Registered Bank,  and  who  is  not  a  director, trustee  or 
employee of any holding company of the Registered Bank, or any other entity 
capable of controlling or significantly influencing the Registered Bank. 
(5)  That the chairperson of The National Bank of New Zealand Limited's board is 
not an employee of the Registered Bank. 
(6)  That  The National Bank  of  New  Zealand Limited's constitution  does  not 
permit The National Bank of  New  Zealand Limited's directors to act in the 
interests  of  any holding company of  the Registered Bank, where to do so 
would  conflict  with  the  interests  of  The National  Bank  of  New  Zealand 
Limited in New Zealand, to the detriment of creditors. 
For the purpose of these conditions of registration, the term 'Banking Group' shall 
mean The National Bank of New Zealand Limited's Financial reporting group (as 
defined in section 2 (1) of the Financial Reporting Act 1993). THE DIRECTORS' STATEMENT 
The directors of The National Bank of New Zealand Limited after due enquiry by 
them, as at the date of the Disclosure Statement (comprising the Key Information 
Summary and this General Disclosure Statement which relates to it), believe that: 
(i)  The Disclosure Statement contains all the information that is required by the 
Registered  Bank  Disclosure  Statement  (Off-Quarter  -  New  Zealand 
Incorporated Registered Banks) Order 1995 
(ii)  The National Bank of New Zealand Limited complies with the conditions of 
registration after noting the disclosure of  excess counterparty exposures set 
out on page 14 
(iii) Credit exposures to connected persons (if any) are not contrary to the interests 
of the Banking Group. 
(iv) The National Bank of New Zealand Limited has systems in place to monitor 
and control adequately the Banking Group's material risks, including credit 
risk, concentration of credit risk, interest rate risk, currency risk, equity risk, 
liquidity  risk  and  other  business  risks,  and  that  those  systems  are being 
properly applied 
(v)  The Disclosure Statement is not false or misleading as at the date on which 
the Disclosure Statement is signed. 
Signed by or on behalf of all the directors: 
P.M.  McCAW, SIR  JOHN  ANDERSON,  G.K.  ANSELL,  D.J.  BENNETT,  J.  CLARKE,  J.T. 
DAVIES, B.R. DICK, B.M.J.  DINEEN, N.M.T. GEARY,  D.B. PIRRIE, SIR BRIAN PITMAN, 
SIR DRYDEN SPRING, P.S. STANNARD, W.J. WHINERAY 
22 May 1997 The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
SHORT FORM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 










For the three months ended 
31 March 1997 
Interest revenue  401 
Less: Interest expense  298 
Net interest income  103 
Net trading gains  13 
Other operating revenue  37 
Total income 
Less: - Expenses 
Operating expenses 
Impaired asset expenses 
Total expenses 
Operating surplus before taxation 
Less: Taxation 
Operating surplus after taxation 
Less: Dividend 
Operating surplus after taxation and dividend The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 









$m  As at 31 March 1997 
Assets employed 
Cash in hand and with central banks 
Call advances to financial institutions 
Other central bank securities 
Other securities held for liquidity and other purposes 
Equity investment securities 
Other investment securities 
Balances with Lloyds TSB Group plc and 
fellow subsidiaries 
Loans, advances and lease finance 
Current and deferred taxation 
Premises and equipment 
Other assets 
Total assets employed  17,679 
Financed by: 
Liabilities 
Deposits and other borrowings 









Total shareholder's equity 
Total liabilities and shareholder's equity  17,679  16,695  16,95  1 
Additional financial position information 
Total interest earning and discount bearing assets  16,718  15,227  15,700 
Total interest and discount bearing liabilities  14,998  13,746  14,127 
There have been no material changes in accounting policies during the period. 
Certain  comparative period  figures  in  these financial statements have been  amended to reflect 













Tier 1 capital (before deductions) 
Less: Deductions from Tier 1 capital 
Total Tier 1 capital 
Upper level Tier 2 capital 
Lower level Tier 2 capital 
Total Tier 2 capital  408.8 
Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital  1,304.4 1,110.2 
Less: Deductions from total capital  2.7 
Total qualifying capital  1,301.7 
Risk weighted exposures 










%  As at 31 March 1997 (Unaudited) 
Cash and short term claims on Government  760.2 
Long term claims on Government 
Claims on banks 




As at 31 March 1996 (Unaudited) 
Cash and short term claims on Government  577.2 
Long term claims on Government  637.6 
Claims on banks  803.5 
Claims on public sector entities  23-5 
Residential mortgages  4,544.4 
Other  9,421.3 
Total  16,007.5 
As at 31 December 1996 (Audited) 
Cash and short term claims on Government  1,068.0 
Long term claims on Government  259.5 
Claims on banks  486.4 
Claims on public sector entities  42.5 
Residential mortgages  5,325.6 
Other  9,438.3 
Total  16,620.3 The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
Capital Adequacy (continued) 
Risk weighted exposures 
2  Calculation of off-balance sheet exposures 
Credit  Credit  Average  Risk 
Principal conversion equivalent  counter-  weighted 
amount  factor  amount party risk  exposure 
As at 3 1 March 1997 (Unaudited)  $m  %  $m  weight  $m 
Direct credit substitutes  52-5 
Commitments with certain drawdown  529.3 
Underwriting and sub-underwriting facilities  171.1 
Transaction related contingent items  105.4 
Trade related contingent items  161.4 
Other commitments to provide financial services 
which have an original maturity of one year 
or more  682.5 
Other commitments with an original maturity of 
less than one year or which can be 
unconditionally cancelled at any time  1,575.6 
Market related contracts 
Foreign exchange contracts  15,719.6 
Interest rate contracts  18,847.1 
Total off-balance sheet exposures  1,021.2 
Total risk weighted exposures  13,672.5 
As at 31 March 1996 (Unaudited) 
Direct credit substitutes  104.3  100  104.3  100  104.3 
Commitments with certain drawdown  1,150.8  100  1,150.8  21  238.6 
Underwriting and sub-underwriting facilities  227.2  50  113.6  100  113.6 
Transaction related contingent items  106.2  50  53.1  100  53.1 
Trade related contingent items  170.0  20  34.0  100  34.0 
Other commitments to provide financial services 
which have an original maturity of one year 
or more  220.5  50  110.3  100  110.3 
Other commitments with an original maturity of 
less than one year or which can be 
unconditionally cancelled at any time  3,458.7  0  100 
Market related contracts 
Foreign exchange contracts  29,494.0  N/A  985.0  32  314.8 
Interest rate contracts  30,086.9  NIA  316.4  26  81.2 
Total off-balance sheet exposures  1,049.9 
Total risk weighted exposures  12,972.6 
' Current exposure method was used to calculate the credit risk on these contracts The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
Capital Adequacy (continued) 
Risk weighted exposures 
Calculation of off-balance sheet exposures (continued) 
Credit  Credit  Average  Risk 
Principal conversion  equivalent  counter-  weighted 
amount  factor  amount party risk  exposure 
As at 31 December 1996 (Audited)  $m  %  $m  weight  $m 
% 
Direct credit substitutes  86.9 
Commitments with certain drawdown  371.7 
Underwriting and sub-underwriting facilities  203.2 
Transaction related contingent items  103.8 
Trade related contingent items  163.6 
Other commitments to provide financial services 
which have an original maturity of one year 
or more  609.0 
Other commitments with an original maturity of 
less than one year or which can be 
unconditionally cancelled at any time  1,584.4 
Market related contracts 
Foreign exchange contracts  16,606.1 
Interest rate contracts  19,157.3 
Total off-balance sheet exposures  901.6 
Total risk weighted exposures  13,134.4 
1 Current exposure method was used to calculate the credit risk on these contracts. 
Capital adequacy ratios 
Unaudited Unaudited  Audited 
3 1/03/97  3 110396  3 1/12/96 
%  %  % 
Total tier 1 capital as a percentage of total risk 
weighted exposures 
Total qualifying capital as a percentage of total risk 









3 1/03/97  3 1/03/96 
Specific  Specific 
Gross Provisions  Net  Gross Provisions  Net 
$m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
Total impaired assets 






Gross Provisions  Net 
$m  $m  $m 
Non-accrual Restructured  Non-accrual Restructured 
assets  assets  Total  assets  assets  Total 
$m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
General provision 
Balance at beginning of period  44 
Advances written off  (3) 
Provisions recovered- 
Charge to statement of financial 
performance  4 
Balance at end of period  45 
Balance at beginning and end of period 
Total bad and doubtful debt provisions The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
Asset Quality (continued) 
Bad and doubtful debt provisions (continued) 
Audited 
Specific provisions 
Balance at beginning of period 
Advances written off 
Provisions recovered 
Charge to statement of financial 
performance 
Balance at end of period 
General provision 
Balance at beginning of year 
Provision sold 
Balance at end of year 
Total bad and doubtful debt provisions 
31/12/96 
Non-accrual Restructured 
assets  assets 
$m  $m 
Total 
$m The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
Concentration of Credit Exposures to Individual Counterparties 
Credit exposure concentration  to  individual counterparties  is  disclosed  on the basis  of  actual 
exposures. 
End  of  day credit exposures - during the three months ended 31 March  1997 for the Banking 
Group: (Unaudited) 
Number of counterparties 
Bank counterparties 
Percentage of equity  3 1/03/97  Peak 
10 % to 19 %  4  1 
20 % to 29 %  3 
30 % to 39 %  1  1 
40 % to 49 %  1 
50 % to 59 % 
60 % to 69 %  1 
Other counterparties 
3 1/03/97  Peak 
4  10 
1 
End  of  day credit exposures - during the three months ended 31 March  1996 for the Banking 
Group: (Unaudited) 
Number of counterparties 
Bank counterparties  Other counterparties 
Percentage of equity  3 1/03/96  Peak  3 1/03/96  Peak 
10 % to 19 %  1  2  7  8 
20 % to 29 %  1  1  1  1 
30 % to 39 %  1  1 
End of  day credit exposures -  during the year ended 3 1 December 1996 for the Banking Group: 
(Audited) 
Number of counterparties 
Bank counterparties  Other counterparties 
Percentage of equity  3 1/12/96  Peak  3 1/12/96  Peak 
10 %to 19 %  2  3  9  12 
20 % to 29 %  3  1  1 
30 % to 39 %  1 The National Bank of New Zealand Limited Group 
Credit Exposures to Connected Persons 
Credit exposures to connected persons are disclosed on the basis of actual exposures. 
Unaudited  Unaudited  Unaudited 
3 1/03/97  3 1/03/96  3 1/12/96 
Credit exposures to connected persons at end of period  $81M  $372M  $76M 
Credit exposures to connected persons at end of period 
as a percentage of total tier 1 capital  9.0 %  43.9 %  8.6 % 
Peak credit exposures to connected persons during the period  $203M  $1,025M  $1,025M 
Peak credit exposures to connected persons during the period 
as a percentage of total tier 1 capital  22.7 %  121.0 %  121.0 % 
During the year ended 3 1 December 1996, credit exposure to connected persons exceeded the limit 
imposed by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The exposure was for a short term money market 
advance to Lloyds Bank Plc and the situation was advised to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
The peak  credit  exposure  occurred  over  a  weekend  period  of  three  days  in  February  1996. 
Procedures were introduced at that time to ensure this situation is unlikely to recur. 
Exposures to Market Risk (Unaudited) 
Market risk exposures have been calculated in accordance with clauses l(a), 8(a) and ll(a) of the 
Eighth  Schedule  to  the  Registered  Bank  Disclosure  Statement  (Off-Quarter  -  New  Zealand 
Incorporated Registered Banks) Order 1995, which requires disclosure for the three month period 
ended 3 1 March 1997. 
The disclosures of market risk exposures are not subject to audit review. 
3 1/03/97  3 1/12/96 
Exposures to market risk  Period end  Peak  Period end  Peak 
Interest rate exposures 
Aggregate ($m)  38.9  39.4  39.6  106.7 
Percentage of  equity  4.1  4.1  4.3  11.6 
Foreign currency exposures 
Aggregate ($m)  2.7  10.9  4.6  8.9 
Percentage of equity  0.3  1.1  0.5  1  .O 
The Banking Group's holdings of equity instruments is not significant. Comparative information is 
not readily available for 3 1 March 1996. Appendix 
Registered Banks as at 30 September 1997 
(a)  New Zealand Incorporated Banks 
Registered Bank 
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited 
ASB Bank Limited 
Bank of New Zealand 
Bankers Trust New Zealand Limited 
BNZ Finance Limited 
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited 
The National Bank of New Zealand Limited 
TSB Bank Limited 
Owner@) 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (75 %), 
ASB Community Trust (25 %) 
National Australia Bank Limited 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation 
National Australia Bank Limited 
Bank of Scotland 
Lloyds TSB Group plc 
TSB Community Trust 
(b)  Overseas Incorporated Banks 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Australia) Limited 
Banque Indosuez 
Banque Nationale de Paris S.A. 
Barclays Bank plc 
Citibank N.A. 
Deutsche Bank A.G. 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited 
Rabobank Nederland 
Westpac Banking Corporation 
Kookmin Bank References 
Bank of England (1997) Standards for Supervisors, The Objectives, Standards and Processes of 
Banking Supervision, Bank of England, February. 
Base1  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  (1997)  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking 
Supervision. 
Benston, G. - Kaufman, G. (1994) Improving the FDIC Improvement Act:  What was Done 
and What Still Needs to be Done to Fix the Deposit Insurance Problem. Ch. 7 in (G. 
Kaufman, ed.) Reforming Financial Institutions and Markets in the United States, Kluwer. 
Brash,  D.  (1997)  Banking  Soundness and the Role  of  the Market.  Address  to  the  IMF 
conference  on  Banking  Soundness  and  Monetary  Policy  in  a  World  of  Global  Capital 
Markets, Washington, 30 January. 
Diamond,  D.W. (1991) Monitoring and Reputation:  the Choice between Bank Loans and 
Directly Placed Debt. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 99, p. 688-721. 
Diamond,  D.W.  (1984)  Financial  Intermediation  and Delegated  Monitoring.  Review  of 
Economic Studies, vol. 51, p. 393-414. 
Diamond, D.W. - Dybvig, P.H. (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 91, p. 401  -419. 
Goodhart, C.A.E. (1996a) An Incentive Structure for Financial Regulation. Seminar on The 
Future of Financial Markets and the Challenges of Supervision, Ministry of Finance and Bank 
of  Finland,  Helsinlu,  p.  67-82  (an  earlier  version  was  published  in  Swiss  Journal  of 
Economics and Statistics, vol 132 (4/2), p. 637-648). 
Goodhart,  C.A.E.  (1996b)  Some Regulatory  Concerns.  Seminar on  The Future of  Financial 
Markets  and  the  Challenges  of  Supervision,  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Bank  of  Finland 
Helsinki,  p. 27-66  (an earlier  version was published in Swiss Journal  of Economics  and 
Statistics, vol 132 (4/2), p. 613-636). 
Harrison, I. (1996) Disclosure of  Registered Banks'  Market Risks. Reserve Bank Bulletin, vol. 
59, no. 2, p. 146- 154. 
Jackson, P.  - Maude,  D.J.  -Perraudin,  W.  (1996) Bank Capital and Value-at-Risk.  Mimeo, 
Birkbeck College London, August. 
Kupiec, P.H. - O'Brien,  J.M. (1995) Recent Developments  in Bank Capital Regulation of 
Market Risks. Federal Reserve Board, November. 
Ledingham, P.  (1995) The Review of  Bank Supervision Arrangements in New Zealand:  the 
Main Elements in the Debate. Reserve Bank Bulletin, vol. 58. 
Liuksila, A.  (1997) Recent Developments in Bank Reorganization Law Under the EU and 
EEA Treaties: A Comparison with US Federal Banking and Bankruptcy Laws. Mimeo. 
Mortlock,  G. (1996)  Banking  Supervision:  Placing a  New  Emphasis on the Role of  Bank 
Directors. Reserve Bank Bulletin, vol. 59. 
Nicholl, P.  (1996) Market Based Regulation. Paper prepared for the World Bank conference on 
Preventing Banking Crises, April 15- 16. OECD (1997) Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Where Have We  Been? 
Where Are We  Going? Paris. 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1995) Review of Banking Supervision: Reserve Bank's Policy 
Conclusions. Reserve Bank Bulletin, vol. 58. 
Zodgekar, S. (1996) New Proposals for Netting and Settlement Finality. Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, August. BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
ISSN 0785-3572 
Peter Nyberg Macroenomic Aspects of Systemic Bank Restructuring. 1997.30  p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-541-0. (KASI) 
Anne Brunila Fiscal Policy and Private Consumption -  Saving Decisions: Evidence 
from Nine EU Countries. 1997. 36 p. ISBN 951-686-542-9. (TU) 
Antti Ripatti Limited and Full Information Estimation of the Rational Expectations 
Demand for Money Model: Application to Finnish MI. 1997.30  p. ISBN 951-686-543-7. 
(TU) 
Mika Poso -  Mikko Spolander  Estimating Exchange Market Pressure and  the Degree 
of Exchange Market Intervention for Finland during the Floating Exchange Rate 
Regime. 1997. 24 p. ISBN 951-686-544-5. (RP) 
Sinimaaria Ranki Monetary Policy in the ERM: Internal Targets or External 
Constraints? 1997.62 p. ISBN 951-686-545-3. (TU) 
Anne Brunila Current Income and Private Consumption -  Saving Decisions: Testing 
the Finite Horizon Model. 1997.70  p. ISBN 951-686-547-X. (TU) 
Monica Ahlstedt Exchange Rate, Interest Rate and Stock Market Price Volatility for 
Value-at-Risk Analysis. 1997.90  p. ISBN 951-686-548-8. (TU) 
Jarkko Jiiiiskelii  Incomplete Insurance Market and Its Policy Implications within 
European Monetary Union. 1997. 83 p. ISBN 951-686-549-6. (RP) 
Helvi Kinnunen -  Mika Tujula Finanssipolitiikan liikkumavara, elakkeiden rahoitus ja 
EMU (The room for fiscal policy manouevring, pension funding and EMU). 1997. 22 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-550-X. (KT) 
Jorma Hietalahti -  Harri Kuussaari Valuuttatermiinimarkkinoiden toiminta Suomessa 
(The Forward Exchange Market in Finland). 1997. 33 p. ISBN 951-686-551-8. (RP) 
Jori Petteri Kiviniemi Monetaariset Divisia-indeksit Suomessa (The Application of 
Monetary Divisia Indices to the Case of Finland). 1997. 27 p. ISBN 951-686-553-4. (RP) 
Pentti Forsman Inflaation haitat (The Harmful Effects of Inflation). 1997.25 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-554-2. (KT) 
Jorma Hilpinen -  Mika Hakuni The Bank of Finland Foreign Rade  Survey 1995-1996: 
A Quality Evaluation . 1997.24 p. ISBN 951-686-555-0. (TP) 
Matti Lappalainen Suomen maksutase 1914-1939:  Taloushistoriallinen katsaus ja 
tilastot (Finland's Balance of Payments, 1914-1939: Review of Economic History and 
Statistical Data). 1997. 95 p. ISBN 951-686-556-9. (TU) 
Juha Tarkka A Model of Common Monetary Policy. 1997. 17 p. ISBN 951-686-557-7. 
(TU) 
Pentti Forsman -  Tuomas Saarenheimo -  Marko Tervio  Time-Varying Markups. 
Empirical Analysis of Markups in Finnish Industries. 1997. 26 p. ISBN 951-686-559-3. 
(KT) Antti Ripatti Inflation Targeting and the Role of Money in a Model with Sticky Prices 
and Sticky Money. 1997. 32 p. ISBN 951-686-560-7. (TU) 
David G. Mayes A Market Based Approach to Maintaining Systemic Stability. 
Expeciences from New Zealand. 1997.45 p. ISBN 951-686-561-5.  (TU) 